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The Center for Preventive Action’s annual Preventive 
Priorities Survey (PPS) evaluates ongoing and potential 
conflicts based on their likelihood of occurring in the 
coming year and their impact on U.S. interests. The PPS 
aims to help the U.S. policymaking community prioritize 
competing conflict prevention and mitigation demands.
View the accompanying online 
interactive, the Global Conflict Tracker, 
at cfr.org/globalconflicttracker 
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3About the Preventive 
Priorities Survey
The upsurge in political instability and violent conflict around 
the world in 2014 caught many people by surprise, not least 
policymakers in the United States, who had to grapple with 
multiple crises in places as diverse as Ukraine, Nigeria, Israel 
and the Palestinian territories, Iraq, and Yemen throughout 
the year. Ideally, early warning of threatening developments 
in those countries could help the United States, either acting 
alone or in partnership with other countries and international 
organizations, to take preventive action to avert the resulting 
crises or at least mitigate their harmful consequences. 
Given the inherent uncertainties in predicting the onset and 
escalation of violent conflict, relying on precise early warnings 
to galvanize such preventive action is not realistic. Instead, 
we advocate a “risk assessment” approach to gauge both the 
likelihood of threatening developments occurring in the 
coming year and their possible implications for the United 
States. This approach helps not only to sensitize policymakers 
to incipient geopolitical risks but also focus their preventive 
efforts on those areas of greatest concern.
The Preventive Priorities Survey represents a qualitative 
risk assessment based on the informed judgment of a large 
number of foreign policy experts, whom we poll each year. 
The PPS asks respondents to assess the likelihood that each 
of thirty plausible geopolitical contingencies will arise in the 
coming year and also to consider how significant an effect 
each would have on U.S. national interests. Potential economic 
crises, financial shocks, and conceivable natural disasters 
were not included in the survey. Although such events can 
undermine political instability and trigger violent conflict, the 
focus of the PPS is limited to relatively discrete geopolitical 
contingencies. Respondents, however, were invited to list 
additional contingencies not included in the survey that they 
felt warranted attention as U.S. conflict prevention priorities.
To bring rigor to this exercise, the survey provided 
the following general guidelines to help each respondent 
estimate the relative probability and impact of the 
identified contingencies: 
■■ Contingencies with a greater-than-even chance of occurring 
in 2015 are classified as having a high likelihood. Those with 
about an even chance of occurring are considered to have a 
moderate likelihood, and those with a less-than-even chance 
are categorized as low likelihood.
■■ Contingencies that could directly harm the United States, or 
involve countries that the United States is already committed 
to protect, are classified as having a high impact. Conflicts 
involving countries of strategic importance to the United 
States but that are not “treaty allies” are considered to have 
a moderate impact on U.S. interests. Contingencies that 
affect countries judged to have limited strategic importance 
to the United States, or for which the risk is essentially hu-
manitarian in nature, are ranked as low impact.
By its very nature, the PPS represents a snapshot of expert 
opinion at the time it was taken in November 2014. The world 
is a dynamic place and assumptions and judgments have to be 
regularly evaluated.
Opposition supporters take part in a march against the government of Nicolás 
Maduro in Caracas, Venezuela, October 18, 2014. (Jorge Silva/Courtesy Reuters) 
A Ukrainian armored vehicle moves along a road near the eastern Ukrainian town of Debaltseve, October 6, 2014. (David Mdzinarishvili/Courtesy Reuters)
4Definitions
impact on u.s. interests
■■ High: contingency directly threatens the U.S. homeland, 
is likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of 
treaty commitments, or threatens the supply of critical 
U.S. strategic resources
■■ Moderate: contingency affects countries of strategic 
importance to the United States but does not involve a 
mutual-defense treaty commitment
■■ Low: contingency could have severe/widespread human-
itarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic 
importance to the United States
likelihood
■■ High: contingency is probable to highly likely to occur 
in 2015
■■ Moderate: contingency has about an even chance of 
occurring in 2015
■■ Low: contingency is improbable to highly unlikely to 
occur in 2015
Risk Assessment Matrix
Left: Rebel fighters gather in a village in Upper Nile State in South Sudan, February 8, 2014. (Goran Tomasevic/Courtesy Reuters)
Right: Afghan National Army soldiers take part in a training exercise at a military base in Kabul, Afghanistan, November 23, 2014. (Omar Sobhani/Courtesy Reuters)
Methodology
The Center for Preventive Action (CPA) carried out the 2015 
PPS in three stages:
1. Soliciting of PPS Contingencies
CPA harnessed various social media platforms and blogs to 
solicit suggestions about possible conflicts to include in the 
survey. With the help of the Council on Foreign Relations’ 
in-house regional experts, CPA narrowed down the list of 
possible conflicts from nearly one thousand suggestions to 
thirty contingencies deemed both plausible over the next 
twelve months and also potentially harmful to U.S. interests.
2. Polling of Experts
The survey was sent to more than 2,200 government officials, 
foreign policy experts, and academics. Respondents were 
asked to estimate the likelihood and impact on U.S. interests 
of each of the contingencies. The respondents also had the 
opportunity to suggest contingencies that did not appear on 
the survey but might warrant attention. The most popular 
suggestions are included at the end of this report.
3. Categorization of Contingencies
The survey results were then scored according to their ranking, 
and the contingencies were subsequently sorted into one of 
three preventive priority  tiers (I, II, and III) according to their 
placement on the accompanying risk assessment matrix.
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5Left: Rebel fighters gather in a village in Upper Nile State in South Sudan, February 8, 2014. (Goran Tomasevic/Courtesy Reuters)
Right: Afghan National Army soldiers take part in a training exercise at a military base in Kabul, Afghanistan, November 23, 2014. (Omar Sobhani/Courtesy Reuters)
2015 Findings
Six new contingencies appear in this year’s survey. Of these, two 
were ranked Tier I contingencies: an intensification of fighting 
in eastern Ukraine between Russian-backed militia forces and 
Ukrainian security forces with the potential for more overt 
Russian military intervention, and heightened tensions within 
Israel and the Palestinian territories. Growing political violence 
in Turkey between various Kurdish groups and Turkish security 
forces exacerbated by spillover from the Syrian civil war was 
determined to be a Tier II priority. Instability in West Africa 
stemming from the effects of the Ebola pandemic; growing 
political unrest in China, particularly in the Xinjiang region 
as a result of Uighur-related tensions; and political instability 
in Thailand that could be exacerbated by a royal succession 
crisis were all considered Tier III priorities. 
Two contingencies surveyed last year received a higher-priority 
ranking for 2015. The first, an intensification of the conflict 
in Iraq due to further territorial gains by the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS), was the only Tier I contingency this year 
ranked as having a high likelihood and high impact. The second 
contingency, an armed confrontation in the South China Sea 
between China and one or more Southeast Asian claimants to 
disputed maritime areas, rose from Tier II to Tier I.
The priority rankings of two contingencies were downgraded 
for 2015. Increased internal violence and political instability 
in Pakistan, now judged to be less likely, slipped from Tier 
I to Tier II. Likewise, political instability and civil violence 
in Jordan stemming from the spillover effects of the Syrian 
conflict is considered less likely to occur in 2015 than in 2014 
and dropped to Tier II as a consequence. Each contingency’s 
importance to U.S. interests continued to be assessed 
as moderate.
Six contingencies included last year did not make the cut for the 
2015 survey. These contingencies do not appear in this year’s 
PPS: continuing conflict in Somalia and intensification of al-
Shabab’s terrorist attacks on neighboring countries, which 
was ranked as a Tier II contingency in 2014; a Sino-Indian 
clash resulting from the escalation of a territorial dispute 
and/or a military incident; the destabilization of Mali by 
militant groups with spillover effects on neighboring areas; 
intensification of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of 
Congo with regional spillover; protracted internal violence in 
Bangladesh; and military conflict between Sudan and South 
Sudan triggered by border and/or resource disputes. All five of 
the latter contingencies were judged Tier III priorities in 2014.
Other Noted Concerns
As the survey was limited to thirty contingencies, 
government officials, foreign policy experts, and 
academic respondents had the opportunity to 
suggest additional potential crises that they think 
warrant attention. The following are the most 
commonly cited:  
■■ increasing Russian interference in the Baltic states, 
particularly Estonia
■■ breakdown in peace negotiations between the Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 
Colombian government
■■ growing violence in Kenya resulting from increased 
attacks by al-Shabab
■■ increasing gang-related violence in Central America
■■ intensification of violence in eastern Democratic Re-
public of Congo with regional spillover
■■ growing political instability in Saudi Arabia
■■ crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in 
Hong Kong
■■ widespread unrest in Zimbabwe surrounding the 
electoral process and/or the death of President 
Robert Mugabe 
■■ competing territorial claims in the Arctic
■■ political unrest following the death of former presi-
dent Fidel Castro in Cuba
Military personnel march in front of the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun in Pyongyang, North Korea, to mark the sixty-first anniversary of the armistice that ended the 
Korean War, July 27, 2014. (Korean Central News Agency/Courtesy Reuters)
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ukraine
iran
iraq
syria
israel
united states
north korea
china
philippines
brunei
vietnam
malaysia
Tier I
Contingencies judged high preventive 
priorities for U.S. policymakers
impact: high
likelihood: high
■■ intensification of the conflict in Iraq due 
to territorial gains by the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and operations by 
Iraqi security forces, as well as ongoing 
Sunni-Shia sectarian violence
impact: high
likelihood: moderate
■■ a mass casualty attack on the  
U.S. homeland or a treaty ally
■■ a highly disruptive cyberattack on  
U.S. critical infrastructure
■■ a severe North Korean crisis caused by a 
military provocation, internal political in-
stability, or threatening nuclear weapons/
ICBM-related activities
■■ renewed threat of Israeli military strikes 
against Iran as a result of a breakdown in 
nuclear negotiations and/or clear evidence 
of intent to develop a nuclear  
weapons capability
■■ an armed confrontation in the South  
China Sea between China and one or 
more Southeast Asian claimants to disput-
ed maritime areas
impact: moderate
likelihood: high
■■ an intensification of the Syrian civil war 
resulting from increased external support 
for warring parties, including military 
intervention by outside powers 
■■ increased violence and instability in  
Afghanistan resulting from the with-
drawal of coalition combat forces and 
strengthening of the Taliban insurgency
■■ an intensification of fighting in eastern 
Ukraine between Russian-backed militia 
forces and Ukrainian security forces, with 
potential overt Russian military intervention
■■ heightened tensions within Israel and the 
Palestinian territories leading to wide-
spread protests and armed confrontations
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lebanon 
jordan
egypt
libya
yemen
nigeria
mexico
japan
china
pakistan
Tier II
Contingencies judged moderate preventive 
priorities for U.S. policymakers
impact: moderate
likelihood: moderate
■■ continued political fracture and grow-
ing militancy in Libya resulting in state 
failure, minimal governance, and further 
military intervention by Arab states
■■ increased instability and terrorist attacks 
in Egypt, particularly in the Sinai Peninsu-
la, resulting in a military crackdown
■■ deepened political instability and civil 
violence in Jordan triggered by spillover 
from the Syrian civil war
■■ increased sectarian violence and political 
instability in Lebanon due to spillover 
from the Syrian civil war
■■ increased internal violence and political 
instability in Pakistan stemming from 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan militancy
■■ intensified political violence in Turkey be-
tween various Kurdish groups and Turkish 
security forces exacerbated by spillover 
from the Syrian civil war
■■ strengthening of al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula resulting from continued politi-
cal instability in Yemen and the expansion 
of Houthi rebel territorial control
impact: high
likelihood: low
■■ an armed confrontation in the East  
China Sea between China and Japan 
stemming from tensions over the Diaoyu/ 
Senkaku islands
■■ escalation of organized crime–related 
violence in Mexico that spills over into the 
United States
 
impact: low
likelihood: high
■■ an intensification of violence and politi-
cal instability in Nigeria related to Boko 
Haram, as well as surrounding the  
general elections
8sudan
south sudan
central african
republic
china
myanmar
thailand
azerbaijan
armenia
pakistan
india
 
venezuela
guinea
sierra leone
liberia
 
Tier III
Contingencies judged low preventive 
priorities for U.S. policymakers
impact: low
likelihood: moderate
■■ growth of political unrest in China, partic-
ularly among the Uighur population
■■ escalation of sectarian violence in the 
Central African Republic between the 
Seleka rebels and “anti-balaka” militias, 
possibly resulting in mass atrocities
■■ intensification of sectarian violence be-
tween Buddhists and Muslim Rohingyas  
in Myanmar
■■ protracted civil war in South Sudan 
stemming from political and ethnic  
divisions
■■ surge in popular unrest and political insta-
bility in Sudan
■■ growing political instability and unrest in 
Thailand, potentially exacerbated by a 
royal succession crisis
■■ deepening political crisis in Venezuela 
leading to civil violence and potential 
regional instability
■■ political instability stemming from 
the impacts of Ebola in West Africa,  
with potential spillover into 
neighboring countries
impact: moderate
likelihood: low
■■ a severe Indo-Pakistani military confron-
tation triggered by a major terrorist attack 
or heightened violence in Kashmir
impact: low
likelihood: low
■■ an outbreak of military conflict between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan over  
Nagorno-Karabakh
About the Center for Preventive Action
The Center for Preventive Action (CPA) seeks to help prevent, defuse, or resolve deadly conflicts around the world and to 
expand the body of knowledge on conflict prevention. It does so by creating a forum in which representatives of governments, 
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, corporations, and civil society can gather to develop operational 
and timely strategies for promoting peace in specific conflict situations. The center focuses on conflicts in countries or regions 
that affect U.S. interests, but may be otherwise overlooked; where prevention appears possible; and when the resources of the 
Council on Foreign Relations can make a difference. The center does this by:
■■ Issuing Council Special Reports to evaluate and respond rapidly to developing conflict situations and formulate timely, concrete 
policy recommendations that the U.S. government, international community, and local actors can use to limit the potential 
for deadly violence. 
■■ Engaging the U.S. government and news media in conflict prevention efforts. CPA staff members meet with administration 
officials and members of Congress to brief on CPA’s findings and recommendations; facilitate contacts between U.S. officials 
and important local and external actors; and raise awareness among journalists of potential flashpoints around the globe. 
■■ Building networks with international organizations and institutions to complement and leverage the Council’s established influ-
ence in the U.S. policy arena and increase the impact of CPA’s recommendations. 
■■ Providing a source of expertise on conflict prevention to include research, case studies, and lessons learned from past conflicts 
that policymakers and private citizens can use to prevent or mitigate future deadly conflicts. 
For more information, to sign up for the CPA Newsletter, or to access the Center for Preventive Action’s latest work, please 
visit our website at www.cfr.org/thinktank/cpa, follow us on Facebook at www.facebook.com/CFRCenterforPreventiveAction, 
or on Twitter @CFR_CPA.
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Displaced people from the minority Yazidi sect, 
fleeing violence from forces loyal to the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), walk toward the 
Syrian border near Sinjar, Iraq, August 11, 2014. 
(Rodi Said/Courtesy Reuters)
